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DIVORCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
J. NELSON FRIERSON*
The present Constitution of South Carolina, adopted in 1895, con-
tains in Article 17, Section 3, the following brief but controlling
provision concerning the subject of this paper:
"Divorces from the bonds of matrimony shall not be allowed in this
State."
In his introductory chapter to the "History of South Carolina
under the Proprietary Government," the eminent historian, Edward
McCrady, who was also a prominent South Carolina lawyer, says:
"Another principle to which the people of South Carolina have
been as devoted, and have clung with equal consistency as to that of
the autonomy of the State, is that of the inviolability of the family
relation. Nowhere has the family bond-the foundation and germ
of all society and government-been more sacredly guarded and
effectually preserved. It has been a part of the Constitution of the
State-unwritten, it is true, until 1895, but nevertheless fully recog-
nized and enforced-that divorce should never be allowed. There
never has been a divorce in South Carolina-province, colony, or
State-except during the Reconstruction period after the war be-
tween the States, under the government of strangers, adventurers,
and negroes, upheld by Federal bayonets. There is but one case of
divorce reported in her law books, and that was during that infamous
rule. The legislature of the State has persistently refused either it-
self to grant divorces or to authorize its courts to do so. In confer-
ring powers and jurisdiction upon its courts those of the ecclesiastical
tribunals were purposely excluded. Whether 'wisely or unwisely,' said
Chancellor Dunkin in a case in which an effort was made to have the
court declare a marriage void, 'the legislature has thought proper to
withhold these powers. They have delegated to no court the authority
to declare a marriage void, and they have never themselves exercised
the authority.' The Constitution adopted in the last year (1895) has
now made the prohibition of divorce a part of the written organic
law of the State. With this inexorable rule in regard to the irrev-
ocability of marriage once entered into the family group has been at
once the source of social and political strength. The people of South
Carolina have recognized and acted upon the great political truth
that in a republican form of government above all others is the family
the strength of the State."
* Dean of the School of Law, University of South Carolina.
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The one case of divorce mentioned by McCrady, while not
named by him, is undoubtedly the case of Grant v. Grant.' Isaac
Grant sued Hannah Grant in an action for divorce from the bonds
of matrimony upon the ground of defendant's adultery. The parties
had been married in January, 1869. In 1872 an act (15 Stat. 30)
was passed permitting divorce from the bonds of matrimony on the
ground of adultery. This action was commenced December 12,
1878. On December 20, 1878, an act was passed repealing all the
laws of the State relating to the granting of divorces. The lower
court dismissed the action on the ground that the Act of 1872 had
been repealed.
Plaintiff's appeal was based on two contentions: 1. That the Act
of 1878 was void as impairing the obligation of the marriage con-
tract. 2. That he was entitled to recover under Article IV, Section
15 of the Constitution of 1868 giving the courts of Common Pleas
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases of divorce. Both contentions were
answered by a unanimous court adversely to the appellant. The
reasoning of the court was: 1. That the impairment provision of the
federal constitution has regard to questions of property and not of
matrimonial status. 2. That under Article XIV, Section 5 of the
State Constitution ("that divorces shall not be "allowed but by the
judgment of a court, as shall be prescribed by law") a specific law
authorizing 2 judgment of divorce was necessary.
In Mattison v. Mattison,2 the action was "A suit of nullity of
marriage." The complainant alleged that, being addicted to habits
of intemperance, he was married to the defendant in the spring of
1840, while in a fit of delirium tremens. By his bill filed in Novem-
ber, 1845, he prayed that the said marriage might be "decreed to be
null, void, and of no effect whatever." The bill was dismissed and
the ruling affirmed an appeal. Want of jurisdiction to declare a
marriage null and void was based on the fact that in England cog-
nizance of matrimonial causes was taken by Ecclesiastical Courts.
The act creating the Chancery Court of South Carolina had con-
ferred on it only such powers as were exercised by courts of Chan-
cery in England.
In the above case the Court of Errors stated that "This Court
has no more authority to entertain a suit for nullity of marriage than
to grant a divorce." More than a half century later, however, in
112 S. C. 29 (1879).
'1 Strob. Eq. 387 (1847).
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Davis v. Whitlock," the Supreme Court of South Carolina, after an
exhaustive investigation of the matter, held that the Courts of this
State have jurisdiction of an action to have a marriage declared null
and void ab initio.
The Court referred to the case of Mattison v'. Mattison,. and
pointed out that that case had been decided under the Constitution of
1790, whereas the case of Davis v. Whitlock arose after the Con-
stitution of 1895 had been adopted. It further pointed out that by
the Constitution of 1895, the marriage of certain persons, such as a
white person and a negro, or a person having a living spouse, or a
brother and sister, is declared void, and is forbidden by the public
policy of the State, as expressed in its Statutes; and after exhaustive
discussion of the matter, the Court concluded that there is no doubt
that the Courts of this State have jurisdiction to declare such at-
tempted marriages void.
On the merits of the case, however, the Court found that the
plaintiff was not entitled to succeed and they therefore reversed the
judgment of the Circuit Court aLnd dismissed the complaint.
The Supreme Court, in this case, had to construe a law which
first appeared in the revised statutes of 1873 and which it quoted
from the Civil Code of 1902, wherein it appears as Section 2661:
"All marriages contracted while either of the parties has a former
husband or wife living, shall be void: Provided, that this section
shall not extend to a person whose husband or wife shall be absent
for the space of seven years, the one not knowing the other to be
living during that time; nor to any person who shall be divorced, or
whose first marriage shall be declared void by the sentence of a com-
petent Court."
In the course of its opinion, the Court said:
"The second marriage during the life of the first husband must under
the Constitution be absolutely void. But the statute, notwithstanding,
does have a very important effect on the status of the spouse who
has been abandoned for seven years as indicated by the statute. He
or she may marry again, and while the wife or husband remains ab-
sent the parties under the second marriage are entitled to full legal
recognition as man and wife with regard to the enforcement of
rights and the assumption of obligations as such; but all this must
be at the risk that if it turns out that the first spouse was alive at the
time the second marriage was undertaken, then the second marriage
will be void, and all supposed rights acquired under it will fall to the
'90 S. C. 233, 73 S. E. 171 (1911).
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ground. The second marriage in such a case is like administration
on the estate of one supposed to be dead. When such a person is
shown to be alive the administration is held void."
A still more recent attempt to have the court declare a marriage
null and void was involved in the case of Jakar v. Jakar.4 Relief
was refused on the ground that the only reasonable interpretation of
the evidence showed that the marriage was consummated by cohabi-
tation. This circumstance takes the case out of the statute granting
relief in such cases.5
It thus appears that while the courts of South Carolina have no
jurisdiction to grant divorces, they do have the power to declare
marriages null and void, in proper cases, but the cases are few and
far between where such relief is afforded.
Returning now to some of the earlier cases involving the question
of divorce in South Carolina, we find the case of McCarty v. Mc-
Carty.6 This case was tried before Judge O'Neall, at Edgefield, in
1847. The question involved was one of title to land. The plaintiff
claimed title through one Bathsheba Worthington, who, about 1800,
was legally married to Robert Worthington. They lived together
only a very short time and then separated, Robert, the husband,
finally moving to Alabama, where he was still living at the time this
action was brought. Bathsheba continued to live in Edgefield, where
she acquired real and personal property over which she exercised all
of the rights as of an unmarried woman. The husband had never,
during all the forty years, asserted any of his marital rights to either
the person or property of this wife. The land in dispute she had
bought and later sold and conveyed by deed to the plaintiff in
1844. The defendant showed no title to the land in himself, but he
contended that the deed from Bathsheba Worthington to the plaintiff
was void because she was a married woman. The trial judge, in
order that the Court of Appeals might pass on the point of law in-
volved in the case, charged the jury, "that they might presume from
the great lapse of time, that the Legislature had passed an Act,
divorcing Bathsheba from her husband, Robert Worthington." When
the case reached the Court of Appeals and was argued there, the
Court reached the unanimous conclusion that, in this State, "An Act
'113 S. C. 295, 102 S. E. 337 (1920).
'CoDE (1902) §2660. See construction of this section in Davis v. Whitlock,
cupra note 3.
'2 Strob. Law 6 (1847).
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granting a divorce can, under no circumstances be presumed from
lapse of time." The reasoning by which the Court reached this con-
clusion was thus stated by Judge John B. O'Neall, who delivered the
opinion of the Court:
"That an Act of the Legislature, after a lapse of twenty years'
possession and use, may be presumed, is, I think, too clear to admit
of doubt. Like a grant, it may be presumed, notwithstanding the
public records show no such thing existed. This, however, is alto-
gether confined to cases in which the Legislature might or might not
act. It cannot apply where, from the Constitution or a sort of com-
mon law of our own, the Legislature never has, and never will act.
Best, in his treatise on Presumptions, §109, p. 145, 37th No. of the
Law Library, tells us there is hardly a species of Act or document,
public or private, that will not be presumed in support of possession.
'Even Acts of Parliament may be thus preswmed. Under this au-
thority, if a divorce ever had taken place, or ever could take place, in
this State, I would not hesitate to say that an Act for that purpose
ought to be presumed, in this case. But, as was said in Boyce v.
Owens, I Hill, 10, 'The marriage contract, in this State, is regarded
as indissoluble by any human means. Nothing short of the actual or
presumed death of one of the parties can have the effect of discharg-
ing its obligations and legal effect.'
"This was my deliberate judgment pronounced and concurred in
by my brethren of the Court of Appeals, Johnson and Harper, nearly
fifteen years ago. It has received the entire sanction and acquies-
cence of the Bench, the Bar, the Legislature, and the people, ever
since. The most distressing cases, justifying divorce even upon scrip-
tural grounds, have been again and again presented to the Legis-
lature, and they have uniformly refused to annul the marriage tie.
They have nobly adhered to the injunction, 'Those whom God has
joined together, let not man put asunder.' The working of this stern
policy has been to the good of the people and the State in every
respect." (Italics by the Court.)
FOREIGN DIVORCES
In the opinion of the Court in the case of McCarty v. McCarty,
from which the foregoing extensive quotation has been taken, refer-
ence is made to the earlier case of Boyce v. Owens.7 In that case
the statement was made that, "The marriage contract in this State
is regarded as indissoluble by any human means."
In making this statement, however, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina was evidently referring only to the municipal law of the
State and did not have in mind a case decided by the Courts of one
1 Hill Law 8 (1833).
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of her sister States and in connection with which the question might
arise in South Carolina as to whether the judgment of that sister
State was entitled to "full faith and credit" in South Carolina.
This question as to the effect in South Carolina of a divorce
granted in another State of the Union, was apparently first consid-
ered by our Court in the case of Young v. Naylor.8 The bill was
filed for an account and the surrender of an estate which came into
the defendant's hands by virtue of a marriage with the plaintiff,
which she alleged was void in consequence of a previous marriage of
the defendant in Maryland to another woman who was still alive at
the time of the filing of the bill in South Carolina. The defendant
answered that previous to his marriage to the plaintiff, the Legis-
lature of the State of Maryland had passed a statute dissolving the
marriage there and divorcing him from his first wife. The statute
was produce and read as follows:
"An Act for the benefit of Margaret W. Naylor, of Charles County."
"Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, that Margaret
W. Naylor, of Charles County, be, and she is hereby divorced from
bed and board and mutual cohabitation of her husband, James Nay-
lor, of George."
The Court stated the question to be, whether the statute of Mary-
land was a divorce a nmnsa et thoro or an absolute divorce a vnculo
matrimonii? For, said the Court:
"If it was a divorce a vinculo, then the defendant was entitled to all
the rights in his present wife's property, given by our laws to lawful
husbands."
The Court decided that the statute of Maryland merely granted a
legal separation to Margaret Naylor from her husband, James Nay-
lor, the defendant in the South Carolina action.
In 1846 the question was presented before the Courts of South
Carolina as to the effect of a Connecticut decree of divorce, in the
case of Hall v. Hullo.
Plaintiffs, lawful children of the testator, sought to set aside his
will leaving his estate to his paramour and illegitimate child to the ex-
tent that it exceeded the amount of such devise allowed by statute.
With respect to the devise to the paramour, the applicability of the
statute turned on whether a Connecticut divorce, testator having been
'1 Hill Eq. 383 (1833).
*2 Strob. Eq. 175 (1846).
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served by publication, should be recognized by the South Carolina
court. It was admitted by the Court that "few subjects are more
difficult-few questions are more perplexing than the effect of a for-
eign divorce." The Connecticut ruling, however, was accepted as an
effective dissolution.
In arriving at this decision, no mention is made by the Court, or
in the argument of counsel, of the Constitutional provisions ap-
plicable, but the conclusion of the Court is rested upon the ground
that the laws of Connecticut "must be regarded as part of his mar-
riage contract," and that "it was then part of the law of his contract,
to submit to a judgment thus rendered."
The Court further says:
"It was part of the law of his contract that it might be dissolved by
wilful desertion of three years, or by seven years absence without
being heard of. This necessarily implies that judgment may be pro-
nounced on these facts in his absence. But if it were necessary, the
Court is prepared to hold that Hull's (testator's) family having been
always permanently resident in Connecticut, that must be regarded as
his, domicile for all the purposes of maintaining the jurisdiction of
the Court and the validity of the sentence." (Italics added.)
In the last sentence of the foregoing quotation where the Court
holds that permanent residence of Hull's family in Connecticut fixed
his domicile in that State, the Court was clearly in error, since the
universally recognized rule concerning domicile is, as stated by the
Court in the case of Hair v. Hair,'0 as follows:
"The husband has the right, without the consent of the wife, to
establish his domicile in any part of the world, and it is the legal duty
of the wife to follow his fortunes, wheresoever he may go."
The question of foreign divorce came again before the Courts of
South Carolina in 1852 in the case of Duke v. Fulmer." The plain-
tiff, Thomas G. Duke, married Louisa Webb in Fairfield District, in
South Carolina in 1820; in 1821 they moved to Georgia. In March,
1822, the wife eloped with another man and the husband never saw
her afterwards. In August, 1822, he instituted proceedings for
divorce in Georgia, against his absent wife. She was made a party
to the action by publication and in October, 1824, he obtained a ver-
dict from a special jury, sustaining his allegations. Afterwards, at
"0 See 10 Rich. Eq. 163, 176 (1858).
" 5 Rich. Eq. 121 (1852).
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his instance, the Legislature of Georgia passed an Act which was
approved by the Governor and which provided for his divorce.
Soon after this divorce, the husband removed to Alabama where,
at the time of the action, he was the reputed husband of another
woman and the father of three children. His wife, Louisa, died in
South Carolina in 1848. In 1849 the husband, Thomas G. Duke,
came to South Carolina and filed his bill against the defendant in the
action, in which bill he claimed, as husband of the late Louisa Duke,
certain moneys alleged to have belonged to her and to have been re-
ceived by the defendants in her behalf. In the Chancellor's decree,
which was affirmed on appeal, it was stated that:
"The common law, as declared by the Judges of England, is clear
against the recognition of foreign divorces as dissolving marriages
contracted in England" (citing Lolley's case, 1 Russ. & Ry. Cases,
236 and other authorities).
The Court decided that neither the decree of the Georgia Courts,
nor the action of the Georgia Legislature, had the effect of dissolving
the bonds of matrimony between Thomas G. Duke and his wife,
Louisa. In so holding it was probably in error, on the ground that
the husband's domicile is the legal domicile of the wife, and that al-
though she may be physically absent therefrom, she is nevertheless
in contemplation of law, legally present there, and consequently is
subject to the jurisdiction of the court in an action for divorce
brought by the husband.' 2 But however this may be, the decision
cannot be supported today upon the ground upon which it was rested
by the Court, namely: that a marriage contracted in South Carolina
is "indissoluble by any human means."
In 1893, the question of the effect of a foreign divorce was again
before the South Carolina courts for decision. It arose in connection
with the claim of dower rights in land and was involved in the case
of McCreery v. Davis, P3 an action demanding the specific perform-
ance of a contract for the sale of land. The defendant refused to
accept a deed to the lands in question, which was tendered to him in
fulfillment of the contract, on the ground that there was no renuncia-
tion of dower endorsed on the deed by the wife of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff contended that the bonds of matrimony which had formerly
existed between himself and his wife had been dissolved by the decree
of a Court in Cook County, in the State of Illinois.
"Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544, 45 L. ed. 794 (1900).
U44 S. C. 195 (1893).
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The action was tried upon an agreed state of facts, from which
it appeared that the plaintiff, McCreery, who was at the time and had
ever since then been a domiciled citizen of the State of South Caro-
lina, was married in 1885 in New York to a citizen of that State.
After the marriage, they returned to plaintiff's home in Columbia,
South Carolina, and lived together as husband and wife until 1887
when the wife left the plaintiff and moved to Chicago, Illinois, where,
in 1891, she sued for an absolute divorce on the ground of cruelty.
Service was by publication, in strict accordance with the laws of Illi-
nois, but the husband did not appear, answer, or demur to the com-
plaint. Thereafter a decree was entered in the Illinois action, affirm-
atively finding the truth of the facts alleged in the wife's complaint,
and ordering and adjudging that the bonds of matrimony theretofore
existing between husband and wife be dissolved.
Upon this decree being properly put into evidence, the South
Carolina Court, which tried the action for specific performance, held
that the judgment of divorce granted in Illinois did not dissolve the
matrimonial relation of the husband in South Carolina and that,
therefore, the plaintiff (the husband) was not entitled to compel
specific performance of the contract by the defendant. The plaintiff
appealed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina upon the ground
that the trial court failed to give "full faith and credit" to the Illinois
decree, as required by the Constitution of the United States.
The Court fully discussed the defendant's contention that mar-
riage constitutes a "status" and that the marriage relationship is a
"res," and in disposing of this contention adversely, the Court says:
"If Mrs. McCreery could carry that res in the State of Illinois, then
Mr. McCreery had the same res in the State of South Carolina, at
the same time. In other words, the same thing could be in two dis-
tinct places at one and the -same time, of which res the courts of Illi-
nois would have the power to control as if it were a physical entity,
and of which res the courts of South Carolina-would have the power,
at the same moment of time, to control as if it were a physical entity.
Such a conclusion would be absurd."
The Court preferred the view, expressed in the earlier case of
Bowers v. Bowers,14 that "Marriage in the State of South Carolina,
has always been regarded as a merely civil contract."
Moreover, the Court pointed out that "Neither the constitutional
provision that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the
1 10 Rich. Eq. 551 (1858).
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public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State,
nor the acts of Congress passed in pursuance thereof, prevent an in-
quiry into the jurisdiction of the Court by which a judgment offered
in evidence was rendered." It then pointed out that the husband had
at all times been domiciled in South Carolina and that the Illinois
Court had never obtained jurisdiction over him. It therefore held
that the Illinois judgment of divorce would not be recognized in the
Courts of South Carolina.
Eleven years after the decision in the above case, the Supreme
Court of the United States handed down a decision of far reaching
importance in the celebrated case of Haddock v. Haddock.15 The
federal question involved in the case was, whether the Court of Ap-
peals of New York had denied to a divorce .decree rendered by a
Court of the State of Connecticut the full faith and credit to which
it was claimed to be entitled under the Constitution of the United
States. The facts were, that the parties were married in New York
where both resided at the time. After the marriage they never lived
together, and shortly thereafter the husband without justifiable cause
abandoned the wife and removed to Connecticut, where he obtained
a divorce several years later. The wife, who had continued to reside
in New York, was served only by publication in the Connecticut suit
and she did not appear in the action. Many years later, the wife
sued the husband in New York (where she still resided) for a legal
separation and for alimony and in this action she obtained personal
service upon him in New York. The husband offered in evidence,
as a defense to the action, the judgment roll in the Connecticut suit
for divorce, but, upon the wife's objection, it was excluded, on the
ground that the Connecticut Court had not obtained jurisdiction
over the person of the wife. This ruling of the New York Court
presented the federal question which was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in favor of the wife. That Court stated
the rule that, when a husband abandons his wife and goes into an-
other State in order to avoid his marital obligations, the wife's domi-
cile does not follow him, but the place where she was domiciled when
abandoned by the husband constitutes her legal domicile until she
acquires another elsewhere. It therefore found that the wife's domi-
cile continued in New York. It recognized the husband's right, how-
ever, to establish his own domicile in the State of Connecticut and
found that he was domiciled in that State at the time that he obtained
"201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867 (1905).
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his decree of divorce. It thus appears that the husband and the wife
had legally separate and distinct domiciles-the husband's was in
Connecticut and the wife's was in New York. Neither State had any
jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident spouse. The Supreme
Court, in concluding its opinion, said:
"Without questioning the power of the State of Connecticut to en-
force within its own borders the decree of divorce which is here in
issue, and without intimating a doubt as to the power of the state of
New York to give to a decree of that character rendered in Connecti-
cut, within the borders of the State of New York and as to its own
citizens, such efficacy as it may be entitled to in view of the public
policy of that state, we hold that the decree of the Court of Connecti-
cut rendered under the circumstances stated was not entitled to
obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue of the
full faith and credit clause. It therefore follows that the court be-
.low did not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion in refusing to admit the Connecticut decree in evidence; and its
judgment is, therefore, affirmed."
In the twenty odd years which have elapsed since Haddock v.
Haddock was decided, the question as to the effect to be given to
foreign divorces by the Courts of South Carolina has arisen with in-
creasing frequency. Often the question involved relates to the mat-
ter of dower, or to the right to share in the estate of a deceased
person. In Shirley v. Parris,16 the point involved was whether a
wife, who had been divorced from her husband in Alabama, had an
inchoate right of dower in lands afterwards acquired by him in South
Carolina. The Alabama decree was rendered in favor of the wife,
who was domiciled in that State, upon the personal appearance and
answer of the husband in the action (he being also apparently domi-
ciled in Alabama) and the South Carolina Court held that:
"The Alabama decree dissolving the Alabama marriage completely
destroyed the status out of which a wife's inchoate right of dower
springs, and no such right could attach to lands afterwards acquired
in this State by the divorced husband."
The Master had held that the Alabama decree was entitled to "full
faith and credit," under the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States as construed in Haddock v,. Haddock, but the State
Supreme Court does not mention this ground in its opinion, but states
"121 S. C. 260, 113 S. E. 788 (1922).
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that the case was ruled by its recent decision in the case of Dawson
v. Della Torre.
17
In the Dawson case, it appeared that the husband, domiciled
in South Carolina, married in Maryland a citizen of that state and
afterwards the parties resided in Charleston, S. C., until 1903, "at
which time the plaintiff and Dr. Dawson separated and lived apart."
The wife returned to Maryland and three years later was granted,
by a Maryland Court, a divorce a vinculo tnatrimonii, the process in
the action having been served upon the husband in a railroad station
in Baltimore while he was passing through the city. Several years
later the husband died at his domicile in South Carolina, leaving real
property located there. The divorced wife claimed dower in the
property. The Circuit Court of the State, in refusing to allow her
claim, held that the Maryland decree, granted in that state, "where
one of the parties is domiciled," "and the other party is personally
served, the judgment of that Court is binding not only on the parties,
but on every Court in every State of the Union where that judgment
is properly pleaded or admitted by the adverse party." The State
Supreme Court, however, instead of resting its affirmance of the
judgment upon the same ground, injects another element into its
decision where it says:
"The marriage was contracted in Maryland under the laws of that
State. In Maryland marriages are contracted in contemplation of
their possible dissolution for certain causes. The Maryland Court,
after personal service on the deceased in Maryland, and upon what
we must assume a proper showing that a cause existed, dissolved the
marriage relation. While this was contracted in view of a possible
dissolution, the South Carolina Court could not have dissolved it for
any cause. The South Carolina courts must, however, under the full
faith and credit doctrine, recognize the dissolution affected by the
same authority that made it. It is hard to imagine a clearer case for
the operation of the full faith and credit doctrine than this."
This would appear to indicate that the South Carolina Court would
conclude that a South Carolina marriage having been contracted
under the laws of that State, which do not allow divorce for any
cause, could not be dissolved by the decree of any Court of com-
petent jurisdiction in any State where the married couple might sub-
sequently be domiciled. This is the old notion expressed in the
IT 116 S. C. 338, 108 S. E. 101 (1921).
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early case of D.wke v. Fulrner,18 where the Chancellor stated in his
decree that:
"the common law, as declared by the judges of England, is clear
against the recognition of foreign divorces as dissolving marriages
contracted in England."
This old notion, however, was based upon the supposed doctrine of
the judges in Lolley's case, which has long been exploded in England.
In the case of Scheper v. Scheper,19 the question was presented
as to whether the claimant was entitled to take a husband's dis-
tributive share in the property of his former wife, who had died
intestate. The parties were married in South Carolina and after
living there several years had moved to North Carolina where the
husband's employment took him. They lived there together as man
and wife for three years, when the wife brought suit and procured a
divorce a mensa et thora, with alimony and the custody of her minor
daughter. She then returned to her old home in South Carolina and
remained here until she died three years later. Meanwhile the hus-
band removed from North Carolina to Georgia and there married
another woman, before the death of his first wife. After the first
wife's death, the husband claimed his share in her property, taking
the grounds that the South Carolina marriage between them had
never been dissolved and that, therefore, he was her lawful husband
at the time of her death and was entitled to share in her estate.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Jus-
tice Marion, held that the claimant was the husband de jure of the
deceased wife at the time of her death; that by the law of North
Carolina, however, where the limited divorce was granted, the effect
of a decree of divorce a rnensa et thoro, was to deprive the husband
of all his marital rights in and to his wife's property; and that the
South Carolina Court would extend to the North Carolina judgment
"such faith and credit," "as will bar the appellant's claim."
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
are very unsatisfactory in their bearing upon this matter of the
recognition of foreign divorces by the Courts of that State. The
cases referred to are Way v. Way2
0 and Goodyear v. Reynolds.2 1
"5 Rich. Eq. 121 (1852).
125 S. C. 89, 118 S. E. 178 (1923).
-132 S. C. 288, 128 S. E. 705 (1925).
124 S. C. 288, 117 S. E. 538 (1923).
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In the Way case, the parties were (apparently) citizens of this State
and were married and lived together here for several years and then
separated. The wife then "became a bona fide resident of the State
of Georgia," and after becoming so, commenced an action in 1920,
in a Georgia Court for an absolute divorce, "and the defendant not
being a resident of the State of Georgia was duly served . . . by
publication in a newspaper." The defendant did not appear in the
action.
The wife, Mrs. Way, intermarried with one Cochran on the 16th
of May, 1921. The judgment of final divorce (a sinculo) was not
rendered in her favor until June 25, 1921, and her former husband,
Way, died on July 15, 1921. The wife then made her claim in the
county where her former husband had lived in South Carolina at the
time of his death, for her share of his estate. This claim was re-
fused and disallowed by the Lower Court and this judgment was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. The reasoning, however, by which
this result was arrived at is not convincing or satisfying. The Mas-
ter, whose report had been confirmed by the Circuit Judge, had found
that the claimant was, "Estopped to question the validity of the said
judgment of divorce," and that she was, therefore, "Estopped to
claim any share in the estate of the intestate" (her first husband).
His report continued, however, as follows:
"I further find that the said judgment of divorce, being legal, valid,
and binding in the State of Georgia, where granted, that under the
full faith and credit doctrine it is legal, valid, and binding here under
the laws of the State of South Carolina, and should be given the
same force and effect here in the State of South Carolina that it has
in the State of Georgia."
Three of the five Justices of the Supreme Court concurred in
affirming the judgment of the Lower Court, "For the reasons as-
signed by the Master." The other two Justices concurred in the
result. One of these two Justices stated, in a short opinion, that the
"judgment of divorce procured by the wife . . . was properly held
to estop her in this action from claiming as the widow of Way a
distributive share in the personal estate of the deceased, Way."
(Citing Scheper v. Scheper, supra.) "But," said the learned Justice,
"Further than that I am not prepared to go." It is respectfully sub-
mitted that Mr. Justice Marion was right in refusing to go the full
length that the majority of the Court went, for the reason that the
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decree of divorce granted by the Georgia Court was not entitled to
recognition in South Carolina under the full faith and credit clause
of the Federal Constitution, as construed in the case of Haddock v.
Haddock.22 As the Connecticut Court had no jurisdiction over the
person of the wife in New York, in the Haddock case, so the Georgia
Court had no jurisdiction over the South Carolina husband in the
Way case.
The other recent case mentioned above is Goodyear v. Reynolds.
The action was for the annullment of a marriage, and was brought
by the husband against the wife on the ground that she had a living
husband at the time of the marriage which the action sought to annul.
The facts showed that Mrs. Goodyear had formerly been Mrs. Rey-
nolds and had obtained a divorce from Reynolds in Georgia, the
State wherein they both were domiciled at the time of the marriage
and which was also the State of the matrimonial domicile, i.e., the
State of his domicile where he and she lived together as husband and
wife. When she sued for divorce, in Georgia, "Reynolds was pre-
sumably in Oklahoma," says the Court in its opinion. The process
was served upon Reynolds by publication and he did not appear in
the action. Upon this showing, the Lower Court held that the sub-
sequent marriage between Mrs. Reynolds and the plaintiff Goodyear
should be annulled, because the Georgia Court had not obtained juris-
diction over Reynolds, the absent husband, and that, therefore, the
Georgia decree of divorce should not be recognized by South Caro-
lina as valid. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed this
judgment, and held that Mrs. Reynolds having "properly procured a
divorce there" (i.e., in Georgia), was free to marry again, and that
her marriage to Goodyear in South Carolina was "a valid and legal
marriage." The only authority cited in the entire opinion is the
celebrated case of Haddock v. Haddock, above referred to, and yet,
mirabile dictu! the decision is in the very teeth of the Haddock deci-
sion, which it professes to follow! How the court went wrong will
appear from the following quotation from its opinion, which, in turn,
quotes two propositions of law laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Haddock case, as having been "Irrevocably
concluded by previous decisions of this Court." Says the South
Carolina Supreme Court:
'Supra note 15.
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"A man who has a matrimonial domicile cannot by a personal change
of his domicile change his matrimonial domicile. In Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U. S. 562,26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1,
the court says:
'Sixth. Where the domicile of matrimony was in a particular
state, and the husband abandons his wife and goes into another State
in order to avoid his marital obligations, such other state to which
the husband has wrongfully fled does not, in the nature of things,
become a new domicile of matrimony, and therefore is not to be
treated as the actual or constructive domicile of the wife; hence the
place where the wife was domiciled, when so abandoned, constitutes
her legal domicile until a new actual domicile be by her elsewhere
acquired....
'Seventh. So also it is settled that, where the domicile of a hus-
band is in a particular state, and that state is also the domicile of
matrimony, the courts of such state having jurisdiction over -the husi-
band may, in virtue of the duty of the wife to be at the matrimonial
domicile, disregard an unjustifiable absence therefrom, and treat the
wife as having her domicile in the state of the matrimonial domicile
for the piurpose of the dissolution of the marriage, and as a result
have the power to render a judgment dissolving the marriage which
will be binding upon both parties, and will be entitled to recognition
in all other states by virtue of the full faith and credit clause'."
(Italics added.)
The South Carolina Supreme Court failed to recognize and apply
the well established rule concerning domicile that, while a husband
may desert his wife, and flee away to another State and there estab-
lish his valid domicile of choice (leaving the wife, of course, domi-
ciled in the State from which he has fled) ; yet the wife, on the other
hand, has no such right, as most distinctly appears from the "Sev-
enth" proposition of law laid down in the Haddock case and cited in
the above quoted portion of the opinion of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court. When a wife deserts her husband and goes to another
state, she does not acquire a new domicile there, but is treated, for
the purpose of jurisdiction for divorce, as if she were personally
present at the matrimonial domicile,28 (i.e., her husband's home),
and this because of her wifely auty to be there. On the contrary,
where the husband deserts the wife and goes to another State and
there establishes his new domicile (as he legally may), the result is
two domiciles. The wife's domicile remains at the home where they
were living when he deserted her, while the husband's domicile is the
new one which he adopted in the State to which he has fled. This
"Supra note 12.
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was the situation in the Haddock case and it was the identical situ-
ation in the case of Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds. In each case the hus-
band deserted the wife and established a new domicile in another
State. Mr. Haddock sued for divorce in Connecticut and served his
wife by publication of the summons only. Mrs. Reynolds sued her
husband for divorce in Georgia and likewise served the summons by
publication. In neither case did the absent spouse appear in the
action, and in neither case did the Court obtain jurisdiction over the
absent defendant whose domicile was in another State from that in
which the action was pending. In both cases decrees of divorce were
granted in favor of the plaintiff in the action. The Supreme Court
of the United States held that the Connecticut judgment was not en-
titled to full faith and credit, while the South Carolina Supreme
Court, citing the Haddock case as the sole authority for its decision
and evidently thinking that it was following that great land mark,
arrived at a diametrically opposite result and held that the Georgia
divorce obtained by Mrs. Reynolds was legal and valid and that, "we
are bound to give full faith and credit to the divorce properly obtained
by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a sister State." It seems
impossible that the decision can stand when the question shall again
be squarely presented for adjudication.
Mention must be made of the serious criminal consequences which
sometimes follow the obtaining, by citizens of South Carolina, of
illegal divorces in other states, followed by attempted second mar-
riages in South Carolina. In such cases, where the marriage tie has
not been legally unloosed in the sister State, in such a way as to be
protected by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion, the criminal arm of the law may fall heavily upon the man or
woman who seeks to be united to a second spouse in this state. A
conviction of the crime of adultery may bring the second honeymoon
to a sad termination, as in the cases of State v. Westmoreland,24 and
State v. Duncan.25 In both of these cases, citizens of South Caro-
lina attempted, without establishing a bona fide domicile in the State-
of Georgia, to have the bonds of matrimony which bound them to.
their South Carolina wives, dissolved and unloosed by the courts of
the sister State. In both cases they returned to South Carolina and
went through the form of a second marriage and lived with the al-
leged second wife, but the State intervened and they were indicted
76 S. C. 145, 56 S. E. 673 (1905).
110 S. C. 253, 96 S. E. 294 (1918).
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and convicted of the crime of living in adultery with the alleged wife
number two; and this in spite of the fact that, in the Westmoreland
case, the first wife actually appeared in person in the Georgia Court
and (apparently) was entirely willing for the divorce to be granted.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, speaking through the late
lamented Justice Woods, held that the Georgia Court had no juris-
diction to render the decree of divorce and that said decree was an
absolute nullity in South Carolina and afforded the defendant no
protection against the indictment.
